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
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Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy

Mednarodni študentski simpozij/International symposium

**ŠTUDENSKI FILOZOFSKI SIMPOZIJ 2019
PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS' SYMPOSIUM 2019**

Zbornik povzetkov/Abstracts Booklet



MARIBOR, 07. 05. – 08. 05. 2019



Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor

And

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

**MEDNARODNI SIMPOZIJ:
ŠTUDENTSKI FILOZOFSKI SIMPOZIJ 2019**

**INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM:
PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS' SYMPOSIUM 2019**

Maribor, 07. – 08. May 2019



Program/Programme

Torek/Tuesday Predavalnica/Room 2.17/FF

09:40 – 10:00	Pozdravni govori/Welcome speeches
10:00 – 10:35	Aleksandra Knežević (University of Belgrade): Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?
10.35 – 11:10	Tadej Todorović (University of Maribor): Multiple Problems of Multiple Realizability
11:10 – 11:30	Odmor/Break
11:30 – 12:05	Guido Tana (University of Edinburgh/Universität Leipzig): Misunderstanding Closure Skepticism
12:05 – 12:40	Urška Martinc (University of Maribor): The Ontological Status of Species: The Problem of the Species Concepts
12:40 – 14:50	Kosilo/Lunch
14:50 – 15:25	Jakub Rudnicki (University of Warsaw): Demonstrations as Features of Contexts: Roaming Between Intentionalism and Conventionalism
15:25 – 16:00	Nikhil Mahant (Central European University): Frege's Troubles with Identity



Sreda /Wednesday

Predavalnica/Room 2.17/FF

10:00 – 10:35	Davide Dalla Rosa (Università di Padova): In Which Sense is Kant's Categorical Syllogistic Different from Classical Logic?
10.35 – 11:10	Karlo Mikić and Augustin Kvočić (University of Zagreb): Paraconsistent Logic, Types of Negation and Geometry of Opposition
11:10 – 11:30	Odmor/Break
11:30 – 12:05	Niko Šetar (University of Maribor): The God That Does Not Exist...Yet
12:05 – 12:40	Jana Vrdoljak (University of Maribor): The Role of Religious Traditions in Modern Democracy
12:40 – 14:50	Kosilo/Lunch
14:50 – 15:25	Sofia Huerter (University of Washington): Animal Standpoint Theory: The Imperative of Interpretation
15:25 – 16:00	Beşir Özgür Nayır (Boğaziçi University): A Fictionalist Rule Consequentialism: Is It Possible?
16.00	Zaključek/Conclusion



Povzetki/Abstracts

Aleksandra Knežević, University of Belgrade

Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why specific organisms have phenomenal experience or qualia. In other words, the hard problem is the problem of explaining how physical processes in the brain lead to a subjective experience. In order to explain the rise of the specific phenomenal experience, there is a tendency in philosophy and science to start an explanation from elaborating how neural mechanisms and other processes in the brain work. This approach is encountered in many problems. One of them is presented by David Chalmers, who also introduced us to the hard problem. He argues that the explanation of phenomenal experience is not reducible to any empirical explanation because empirical explanations would always be insufficient. That is why a group of scientists and philosophers led by Giulio Tononi took the opposite approach. Instead of proceeding from scientific facts, they proceed from consciousness itself, in whose existence they are certain. The first step in this approach is the identification of the essential properties of consciousness – axioms and, from there, inferring the postulates that describe the properties physical mechanisms should have in order to explain the emergence of consciousness. This is the process of Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT is a qualitative and quantitative formal framework on the basis of which it can be determined whether a particular physical system is conscious and if it is, to what extent. The main parameter for determining the amount of consciousness in a system is the value of Φ , which is the measure of integrated information in a system. If the value of Φ is above 0, then the system is conscious. A computer scientist, Scott Aaronson, noted that IIT has weird predictions. For example, it implies that if a simple system, such as a 2D grid, has a value of Φ five times greater than someone's brain, than 2D grid is five times more conscious than someone's brain. That is why, according to Aaronson, having a large value of Φ is not a sufficient condition for consciousness, even though there might be a possibility that the value of Φ is a necessary condition.

My main goal is to investigate what are the consequences of IIT and its criticisms, especially in terms of panpsychism. Panpsychism is a view that every physical thing is in one way or another associated with consciousness. This theory of mind juggles between physicalism and dualism, successfully managing to avoid the strongest criticisms pointed to each one of them. For the purposes of my main goal, I will present my research in the order similar to the one expressed above. First, I will explain the hard problem in a more detailed way, continuing with the discussion on panpsychism, which naturally follows. Second, I will present the axioms and postulates of IIT and then I will explain what integrated information really is. In this section, I will discuss explanatory and predictive powers of IIT but also its contra-intuitive predictions. I will finish by making a comparison between panpsychism and IIT.

Keywords: consciousness, integrated information theory, panpsychism, phenomenal experience, the hard problem



Tadej Todorović, University of Maribor

Multiple Problems of Multiple Realizability

One of the most influential arguments of the 20th century against psycho-neural identity theories (type-type reductionism) in philosophy of mind must be the multiple realizability argument. The argument, first advocated by Putnam and later Fodor, can be succinctly summarized as the thesis claiming that a mental kind can be realized by distinct physical kinds. The most ubiquitous example in the literature is naturally the example of pain. According to proponents of the multiple realizability thesis (MRT), the mental kind pain can be realized by various physical states that share no features in common. Kind Pain can hence not be reduced to a single psycho-neural kind, as it can be realized by distinct physical kinds, therefore type-type psycho-neural identity theories about the mind-body problem are false.

The MRT seemed to go unchallenged throughout the second part of the 20th century; however, it has recently been problematized by various authors in philosophy of mind (e.g. Shapiro, Polger, Kim, Bechtel, etc.). In what follows, I will present three distinct challenges to the MRT and endeavour to show whether these challenges are effective in dismantling MRT or not.

First I will focus on establishing the fact that MRT is an empirical thesis and should be treated as such, *pace* some branches of functionalism. The issue of what constitutes a genuine case of MR will follow. I will present various criteria of different authors that aim to encapsulate the issue, hoping to show that one must first establish what kind of MR is problematic for type-type reductionism and what are the potential problems of the proposed criteria.

The second problem presented will deal with mental (and other scientific) kinds, the classification of them, and how MRT might be vulnerable to such attacks. The third problem will deal with the issue of scientific reductionism, i.e. what it means that a (mental) kind in theory T_2 is reducible to a kind in theory T_1 and how multiple realizability in scientific reductionism might affect the MRT in philosophy of mind.

The overall goal is to show that the MRT is, (1) an empirical thesis and should be treated as such, (2) that the concepts of MRT, mental kinds, and scientific reductionism are not sufficiently clarified, and that (3) when analysed, they might not pose a problem to type-type reductionism.



Guido Tana, University of Edinburgh/Universität Leipzig

In Support of a Neo-Moorean Anti-skeptical Strategy

The following presentation has the aim of responding to a number of contemporary objections to *Closure Skepticism*. The outcome of the proposed counter-objections is to provide a more thorough understanding of the kind of skeptical doubt engendered by the Closure principle, and what kind of threat to knowledge it sustains. The objections taken into consideration both argue that the principle cannot generate radical skepticism as it fails to establish such a doubt, either on formal grounds (Roush 2010, Atkins&Nance 2014) or by relying on a mistaken conception of perceptual reasons (Schönbaumsfeld 2016, 2017). It will be argued that both stances misunderstand what Closure Skepticism amounts to by neglecting a fundamental component of its structure – the Argument from Ignorance –, and that they mistake the threat exercised by Closure skepticism as one concerning the truth of ordinary propositions, rather than threatening our knowledge of such propositions.

Closure-based skepticism is presented as having two main elements:

- The Closure Principle: If one knows H, and also knows that H implies \neg SK, and competently deduces \neg SK from H, thereby coming to believe \neg SK, while retaining one's knowledge that H, one comes to know that \neg SK (Hawthorne 2005:43)¹
- The Argument from Ignorance: I know that H only if I know that \neg SK. I do not know that \neg SK. Therefore, I do not know that H. (Leite 2004:336, Pritchard 2005:37, DeRose 1995:1).

Combining these two components, the skeptical argument is expressed by this inconsistent skeptical triad:

- A) One has no means of establishing \neg SK
- B) The Closure principle
- C) We have widespread everyday knowledge (Pritchard 2015:15, 2016:204)

Roush's *defective strategy* against closure skepticism argues that the implication $H \rightarrow \neg$ SK doesn't hold; one might be a Brain-in-a-Vat while having hands. To account for this possibility the skeptic has therefore to revise \neg SK as $\neg(\neg H \wedge BIV)$ in order to maintain the skeptical triad functional. If this is allowed, Roush argues, it is repeatable for any ordinary proposition, until \neg SK includes so many of the propositions we ordinarily take ourselves to know that nothing is left to doubt anymore. It is argued that the strategy fails; this inflation of \neg SK cannot be undertaken if the argument from ignorance is properly taken into account. The argument from Ignorance prohibits our knowledge of H, which is the first step of the anti-skeptical defective strategy (Avnur et al 2011:446) and given that the implication between H and \neg SK is rejected, no amount of ordinary knowledge will be capable of establishing the denial of the skeptical hypothesis.

The argument from ignorance has been attacked by Genia Schönbaumsfeld's *perceptual reasons strategy*, which equates it to the *Reasons Identity Thesis*. This strategy asserts that closure skepticism unwarrantedly presupposes that in both the veridical as well as in the skeptical case, the epistemic reasons afforded to us by perception will be necessarily the same. A counterexample is offered to show that closure skepticism does not need to endorse this thesis in order to motivate epistemological doubt. Epistemic value of perceptual experience is lost as the result of the skeptical argument, rather than as its presupposition.

¹ H="here is a hand/I have a hand"

\neg SK="the (Brain-in-a-Vat) skeptical scenario doesn't subsist"



The outcome of this defense of closure skepticism is twofold: these strategies neglect the import of the argument from ignorance because they misunderstand closure skepticism as threatening the truth of what is attended to in experience, rather than the possibility of our ever knowing it. Furthermore, this analysis establishes that closure skepticism has a stronger epistemic standing than neo-Moorean answers to it due to the ignorance predicament (Kraft 2015), and by harboring a connection to further forms of skepticism, such as debasing (Schaffer 2010) and underdetermination skepticism (Pritchard 2015).

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Urška Martinc, University of Maribor

The Ontological Status of Species: The Problem of the Species Concepts

In this article, we will look at the problem of the philosophy of biology, which embraces quite a wide range of issues. This is a problem of the ontological status of the species. Within this problem, we will focus on the problem of species concepts. As we know, there are quite a few concepts of species, and we will make an overview of the most popular. The most popular species concept is Mayr's biological species concept; in addition, we will look at other popular species concepts, such as the ecological species concept, the evolutionary species concept, the phylogenetic species concept, the phenetic species concept, the genetic species concept and others. As mentioned above, the most recognizable is the biological species concept, thus we will also look at examples of this concept. We will examine the views of authors who advocate for certain concepts and try to analyse different characteristics of each individual species concept.

Within the very problem of the ontological status of the species, we will try to clarify the difference between the species monism and the species pluralism. In this article, we will rely on the works of different authors such as Mark Ereshefsky, Ernst Mayr, Kevin De Queiroz, Philip Kitcher, David Hull, Elliot Sober and others.

Keywords: species concepts, biological species concept, species monism, species pluralism.



Jakub Rudnicki, University of Warsaw

Demonstrations as Features of Contexts: Roaming Between Intentionalism and Conventionalism

In his “From Meaning to Content: Issues in Meta-Semantics” (2015), Recanati offers a difficulty for the traditional way of thinking about semantics of demonstratives. His conclusions takes the form of a dilemma: we have to either (1) break the linguistic meaning–character unity, or (2) agree that characters do not determine contents, and make room for speaker’s referential intentions in our semantic model.

According to Recanati, what forces us into the dilemma is *Brandom’s constraint* (Brandom, *Between Saying and Doing*, 2008) that seems to be precluding a theory that keeps the character equated to the linguistic meaning while also not referring to the speaker’s intentions. The constraint comes down to the idea that objects that are supposed to be supplied into the contents of propositions as *designata* of demonstratives cannot do so by virtue of being parts of the context. That is because, if characters are to do any real work, it is them that the language users should be directed by towards the relevant parts of the context in order to be able to fill in the referents of the demonstrative expressions.

The aim of my talk is to propose a new theory of demonstratives that does not violate Brandom’s constraint and also escapes Recanati’s dilemma by treating demonstrations, rather than the objects of demonstrations, as parts of the contexts. I will also try to offer a reason for not worrying too much about the classic Wittgensteinian critique of ostension as chronically ambiguous.

Keywords: demonstratives, semantics, Brandom’s constraint, Kaplan, ostension,



Nikhil Mahant, Central European University

Frege's Troubles with Identity

There is a profusion of problems about identity in philosophy. One such problem is the puzzle about the relation of the equality (“Gleichheit”) relation that Frege raises in his 1892 paper “On Sense and Reference”. Frege considers two proposals on what the relation of the equality relation could be – it could be a relation between an object and itself, or it could be a relation between names or signs of an object – and presents considerations against both proposals. Equality, Frege says, cannot be a relation between an object and itself because otherwise the cognitive significance of identity statements would be difficult to explain, and it cannot be a relation between names because otherwise it will be difficult to explain why all statements of identity are not statements about what words in language mean but sometimes also contain valuable information about the world or the relevant subject matter (e.g. astronomy, mathematics etc.)

It is possible to distinguish between a stronger and a weaker sense of the equality relation. In the weaker sense, equality can be thought of as the circumstance of sameness of two entities in some respects (e.g. two chairs of the same model manufactured by the same manufacturer are same in this sense), and in the stronger sense (“in the sense of identity (identität)”) equality can be thought of as the circumstance of entities being the same in all respects (e.g. all objects are ‘equal’ to themselves in this stronger sense.) That Frege means to use the word ‘equality’ in the stronger sense is indicated by his choice of examples (Morning star = Evening Star) and is also explicitly stated by him in the first footnote of “On Sense and Reference”.

However, if Frege intends to use the word “Equality” in the sense of identity, the absence of a key characteristic of identity, i.e. indiscernibility of identicals, seems conspicuous by its absence in Frege’s argument concerning the relation of the equality relation. And unless the law of indiscernibility of identicals is accepted as a genuine characteristic of the identity relation, it will be entirely mysterious why many of the problems concerning identity, e.g. the problem of identity through time, the problem of personal identity etc. are at all puzzling. However, if we do include Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility of identicals as a consideration in Frege’s argument concerning the relation of the identity relation, then the conclusion that equality must be a relation between an object and itself becomes trivial and obvious. After all, Frege presents “ $a=b$ ” as an example of an equality, and the names “a” and “b” are obviously different from each other (as they have different shapes) and thus cannot be identical – and because Frege uses the word equality in the sense of “identity” – cannot be equal to each other. What is then puzzling about the ‘puzzle’ about the relation of identity relation that Frege poses in the second line of “On Sense and Reference”?

In this paper, I will argue that the puzzle about the relation of the Equality relation is not a puzzle about the identity relation – that identity is a relation between an object and itself is simple and unproblematic – but is rather a puzzle concerning the sign of equality in language (usually represented by “=”). Frege’s puzzle must be understood as the problem concerning the ambiguity of the “=” sign, and what Frege is actually asking is whether the “=” sign refers to the identity relation or the co-reference relation. Further, it is widely believed that Frege’s central purpose behind writing “On Sense and Reference” was to argue for the existence of senses. In this paper, I will also argue that the actual solution to the puzzle about the relation of the equality relation is orthogonal to Frege’s argument for the existence of senses in “On Sense and Reference” and thus whichever way the puzzle about relation of equality relation is settled, it would not affect Frege’s argument concerning the existence of senses.

Keywords: Frege’s puzzle, identity, equality, Leibniz’s law, sense.



Davide Dalla Rosa, Università di Padova

In Which Sense is Kant's Categorical Syllogistic Different from Classical Logic?

This talk aims at offering a reconstruction of Kant's theory of categorical syllogistic in his general logic. The reconstruction shall highlight the differences between Kant's syllogistic and a possible formalization of it in classical first-order predicate logic. From some problematic issues involved in this reconstruction, it will be held that Kant's theory of categorical inferences of reason, as it is placed in the context of his general logic, seems at first glance to not match some desiderata that are related to the traditional extensional interpretation of terms in the Aristotelian syllogistic, and in general to some deductions allowed in traditional syllogistics.

I will focus myself in particular on the syllogistic moods *Baroco* and *Bocardo*, even though I will mention *Disamis* and some other valid moods too. In traditional syllogistic, the former two moods cannot be proved to be valid through the rules of conversion, but they require a *reductio ad absurdum* or, only in the case of *Bocardo*, a further procedure of reduction called *ecthesis*. Since Kant almost does not mention and features these methods of proof in his general logic, it remains unclear how to account the reduction for these syllogistic moods, also comparing it with what Kant explicitly says about reduction for syllogisms in each syllogistic configuration.

The structure of the talk will then be as follows. First, a fairly general assessment of Kant's syllogistic and a reconstruction of Kant's version of the so-called dictum de omni et de nullo that is based on his published works (§1) will be given; then the talk will examine in more details some reconstructions of *Baroco*'s and *Bocardo*'s possible reduction to the perfect syllogistic moods that do not employ a *reductio ad absurdum*, but that seem to require different kinds of alternative devices not mentioned by Kant (quantification in concepts, obversion, transposition of premises) as well as the reduction of syllogistic moods that seemingly make use of the immediate inference known as *conversio per accidens*, that implies a relation of subalternation between terms which does not hold in classical first-order predicate logic (§2). I claim that the issues connected with these accounts, amongst the others the ones related to the existential import of singular and universal judgements in Kant's theory (§3), could in principle support the problems that we encounter in giving a satisfactorily account of Kant's categorical syllogistic and of the difficulties we face in proving some specific moods.

It will be concluded, however, that neither subalternation nor the exclusive negation involved in the *reductio* proof seem to be so problematic from the point of view of Kant's theory of categorical syllogisms in his general logic, but rather that this unaccountability has to be ascribed to the restriction on inferential rules theorized by Kant.

Following this argumentative line, it shall be argued that for these reasons Kant's syllogistic as a logical theory shows a behaviour which is somehow divergent from its possible formalization in classical first-order predicate logic, being in a way non-classical.



Karlo Mikić and Augustin Kvočić, University of Zagreb

Paraconsistent Logic, Types of Negation and Geometry of Opposition

This paper is based on a highly influential attack on the mere possibility of paraconsistent logic by the late B.H. Slater. Slater's argument rests on affirming the correctness of the traditional notion of Aristotle's square of opposition, specifically the relations of contradictoriness and sub-contrariety. Slater's main claim is that classical Boolean negation is a contradiction-forming operator, whereas G. Priest's system LP for example employs a paraconsistent type of negation which is in fact a sub-contrariety-forming operator, and that for paraconsistent logic to be what it claims to be it should use a Boolean negation for forming true contradictions, but that being impossible on the definition of contradictoriness, it follows that there is no such thing as paraconsistent logic. Slater's paper was followed by a few rebuttals written by Priest, G. Restall, J.Y. Béziau, M. B. Brown and others, resting upon an uncritically wide notion of paraconsistent logics that Slater tries to sweep away with his single shot, conflating the diverse family of paraconsistent logics with particular dialetheistic systems.

That discussion evolved into inquiry about the nature of negations from a modal point of view, putting Boolean negation in terms of necessary falsity and the 'softer' kinds of negations as possible falsity. Drawing on the extension of square of oppositions of A, E, I, O propositions to logical hexagon with addition of U and Y devised by R. Blanché and A. Sesmat, the study of various other n-dimensional forms proliferated, under the common name of logical bi-simplexes. The consequence relations defined on such theories proved to be multivalued beyond the scope of Suszko's thesis, opening new mathematical possibilities for the study of paraconsistency.

The main role of present paper is to navigate through the development of this debate(s) and to sum up its results. We also hope to chip in with our own perspective on the topic of paraconsistency and contradictions from the standpoint of the meta-language/object-language distinction, the strict logical motivations for extending the traditional square of opposition and with modelling a paraconsistent system with classical Boolean negation.



Niko Šetar, University of Maribor

The God That Does Not Exist...Yet

In the beginning, there was Nick Bostrom's Simulation hypothesis, leading to a trilemma on what the odds are of us living in a simulation. The first horn of the trilemma says that there are next to none posthuman civilisations; the second claims that such civilisations are extremely unlikely to run an ancestor simulation. However, the third claims that in case neither of the above is true we can be nearly certain that we are, in fact, living in a simulation.

The first task of this paper will be to evaluate which of these options is statistically most probable. Whatever the outcome of this preliminary investigation, we will therefrom focus on the third horn of the trilemma – that we almost certainly live in a simulation. The question arises, what is the purpose of the simulation, and who might be running it?

An utterly insidious answer can be found in a 2010 post on the internet forum LessWrong, an answer that has since been dubbed Roko's Basilisk. It postulates the existence of a singular, nearly omnipotent artificial superintelligence whose original purpose was to increase human pleasure and alleviate human suffering. However, one of the most efficient methods of doing so is reaching back into the past and punishing those that were not altruistic by its definition, which, most unfortunately, includes everybody who had ever known about the (future) existence of the Basilisk but did not contribute to its development. The punishment is carried out via a simulation of an ancestor's conscience recreated from all available data on the person.

If we accept that the reconstruction of someone's conscience is identical to that person's original conscience, the prospect of being punished for eternity for simply knowing of the Basilisk's existence and not acting upon it is less than appealing. The question this paper will therefore deal with is how deep does this rabbit hole go? What is the actual likelihood of such an AI existing? Would it indeed be inclined to carry out punishment in such manner? Is it more likely that we are living our original lives now or that we are already living in its simulation, being punished or rewarded respectively? And if it will most likely exist and carry out such punishments, should we act in its favour and obey its rules to avoid the 'hell' it will put us in if we do not, as if it was some kind of god?



Jana Vrdoljak, University of Maribor

The Role of Religious Traditions in Modern Democracy

The question of the role of religious ideas in modern democracy has caused heated discussions among various thinkers. Two important contemporary views emerged from these discussions:

1. The liberal view, and
2. The traditional view or the theologically oriented position.


Proponents of the liberal view such as Richard Rorty, Robert Audi and Seyla Benhabib argue in favour of secularism. Richard Rorty thinks that religion is a conversation stopper (Rorty, 1999). Audi thinks that “religious fundamentalism is a powerful force... and that in some of its forms can be hostile to democracy” (Audi, 1997, 1). Benhabib, in her communicative ethics, gives privilege to secular culture. She thinks that moral conventionalism and limitation of reflexivity is an indication of rationality deficit. (Benhabib, 1992). They all believe that religion should be separated from politics. This separation is believed to be an achievement of Enlightenment and it is built into the Constitution of the USA. Regarding the Constitution of USA, Wolterstorff sees the new relation between religious people and the state as something never seen before, as a radical and risky experiment, which can be “summarized in four structural principles:

1. Church and state are to be distinct in institutions.
2. Freedom of religious exercise. The state is to not govern how people exercise their religion.
3. The state when distributing the benefits and burdens is not to discriminate in its treatment of citizens on account of their religion or lack of it.
4. There is to be no differentiation among citizens in the right to hold office in the state and a right to political voice” (Wolterstorff, 2010).

Hauerwas, in his anti-liberal rhetoric, is a radical proponent of the traditional view. Modern ethics is viewed as a succession of problems calling for decisions and character is eliminated from ethical consideration. Under MacIntyre’s influence, he emphasizes the importance of virtue ethics in society.

Wolterstorff argues that religion should play a larger role in public political debate, especially in free and democratic societies. Wolterstorff argues that citizens discussing social and political questions should be allowed to use whatever reasons they find appropriate, including religious reasons, if liberal democracy is committed to preserve liberty of all. He goes even further by saying, “The liberal is not willing to live with a politics of multiple communities. He still wants communitarian politics. He is trying to discover and to form the relevant community. He thinks we need a shared political basis” (Wolterstorff, 1997, 109).

Since the discourse between the two views was “unable to provide a satisfactory account of the role of religious traditions in modern democracy” (Stout, 2004, 184), Stout tried to find the answer somewhere else. He questioned the occurrence of the great separation. His doubts were raised given the circumstances in which the civil right movement with the Baptist preacher Martin Luther King Jr. ahead developed. There is Gandhi, who non-violently strives for the independence of India. Researching back in history, he found many other similar examples of religiously motivated people who strive for changes in political affairs (Las Casas against slavery of Indians, Emerson for abolitionism).



The other issue Stout emphasized was that many thinkers use the term religion but mean different things when using the term. The main difference in conception is whether it is perceived as a moral virtue or as a vice, oppression, or tyranny. These notions should be clarified before a discourse takes its course.

The discourse concerning the relation between religion and politics has a long history. Contemporary thinkers, philosophers, and theologians who dedicated decades of their time resolving the issue may, I hope so, agree with Wolterstorff on one thing: “Character of the debate is important. How the debate is conducted. Not as much as content but how it is conducted. Citizens are to treat each other civilly, become informed, be willing to present their reasons to others, be willing to listen to reasons of others... Treat our fellow citizens with dignity and honour and justice and respect.”



Sofia Huerter, University of Washington

Animal Standpoint Theory: The Imperative of Interpretation

In recent years, several scholars in animal ethics have called for the extension of feminist standpoint theory to include nonhuman animals. The chief impetus for this move has been a disenchantment with liberal treatments of speciesism as a problem of human chauvinism, one that is best combated by way of rational argumentation. An alternative account sees speciesism as a process of subjectivization and ideological interpellation, where the conflictual relationships in which humans and other animals find themselves are constitutive for the formulation of their differential subject positions and the forms of consciousness they imply. Standpoint feminism, which is both a critique and revision of Marx's historical materialism, is principally concerned with how power relations inflect knowledge, emphasizing the importance of perspectival differences in how the world appears to us based on our social location. Somewhat infamously, most iterations of the theory include an epistemic privilege thesis to the effect that marginal social positions furnish better insight into the ideational bases of oppression than is afforded to the socially privileged, who benefit from their continued obfuscation. As such, the central tenet of standpoint feminism is to treat women's experiences as the point of resistance to the male hegemony that dominates traditional fields of knowledge, the rationale being that women's lives, by virtue of their subordinate position under patriarchy, differ structurally from men's, and can therefore be the source of illuminating knowledge claims about not only themselves but the whole of the social order.

The critical advance of animal standpoint theory lies in its attempt to move beyond the human perspective so as to reveal the ideological mechanisms by which speciesism is sustained. Given that ideology critique is central to projects involving standpoint analysis, I believe that feminist standpoint theory lends itself to such a task. My objective in what follows, therefore, is to address what I take to be the most pressing difficulties attending the application of feminist standpoint theory to animals, and to vindicate standpoint theory as providing not only a viable theoretical basis for animal liberation scholarship, but a superior alternative to the liberal approach. In order to realize the benefits attributed to feminist standpoint analysis, I foresee at least two problems that must be resolved concerning its application to nonhuman animals, the more fundamental of which, perhaps, is that feminist standpoint theory suffers a latent anthropocentrism; it is not obvious that nonhuman animals can achieve the kind of collective self-recognition definitive of a standpoint, which results from a politically-motivated articulatory practice. Secondly, there is the problem of generalizing about all animals. Insofar as feminist standpoint theory is charged with essentializing women's experiences, the notion of animal standpoint theory is bound to suffer the same criticism with an even greater intensity, given the sheer number of nonhuman species, as well as the complex connections and heterogeneous relationalities that obtain between humans and other animals. My defense of animal standpoint theory thus proceeds with an eye to these challenges.



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A Fictionalist Rule Consequentialism: Is It Possible?

Among moral philosophers of late 20th and early 21st centuries like David Copp and Brad Hooker, it is a commonly affirmed idea that a moral code is to be desired by the agent as a socially enforced and generally subscribed moral rule.¹ This requirement seems to be acceptable and intuitively admissible for a moral consequentialist. However, it has several dimensions and for each there will be at least one fundamental question to be answered. Some aspects of it are already held before. However, there is one philosophically crucial aspect that is not clear enough.

Most versions of consequentialism lay upon a form of moral realism. It does not matter whether they are moral absolutists or pluralists; most of them assume that there are moral facts. They just differ on the whatness of those facts, as well as ways of attaining them. For example, for an act utilitarian there is a moral fact for an individual act *a* under certain circumstances at a given time. For an agent *A* given all the related information *d* at a certain time *t* there is a moral fact that an act *a* participates. Act utilitarians are trying to find the best way to approximate that very fact with limited information. Rule utilitarians make the same assumption when they put a moral rule regarding types of actions: they necessarily assume that there is at least one moral fact related to that type of action and a well-formed moral rule will approximate that fact.

What I claim is that an anti-realist non-utilitarian moral consequentialism is possible. Furthermore, holding on to the idea that a moral code shall be desired to be socially enforced and generally subscribed is much easier if one accepts that there are no moral facts. In this paper, I claim that (1) there are no moral facts, (2) fictionalist consequentialism is grounded upon agents' assumed will to make the world 'better', and (3) such a moral theory should be a rule-oriented non-utilitarianism. At the end, this project is expected to be (1) less vulnerable to usual criticisms made for consequentialism, and (2) more functional than its alternatives. I will especially refer to several ethicists and metaethicists² to bridge moral fictionalism and rule consequentialism.

Keywords: rule consequentialism, moral fictionalism, anti-realism, metaethics, ethics

¹ See Hooker, B. (2000). *Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialist theory of morality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Copp, D. (2001). *Morality, normativity, and society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

² Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West (2005) Moral fictionalism versus the rest, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 83:3, 307-330; Joyce, Richard (2005) Moral fictionalism, in *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, M. E. Kalderon (Ed.), Broadbridge: Clarendon Press.

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